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Introduction 
Over the past decade, the traditional corporate network has come under siege from a 
proliferation of viruses and malicious intruders.  As a result, numerous network 
security technologies, methodologies, and policies have been developed to secure the 
business system.  In comparison, process control systems, with their reliance on 
proprietary networks and hardware, have long been considered immune to cyber 
attacks.  Now, with the move to open standards such as Ethernet, TCP/IP, and web 
technologies, the plant floor requires its own security procedures to eliminate 
undesirable access to production systems and to maximize the uptime and efficiency 
of process networks1. 
Web-based Automated Process Control systems are a new type of applications that 
use the Internet to control industrial processes with the access to the real-time data.  
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks contain computers and 
applications that perform key functions in providing essential services and commodities (e.g., 
electricity, natural gas, gasoline, water, waste treatment, transportation) to all Americans.  As 
such, they are part of the nation’s critical infrastructure and require protection from a variety 
of threats that exist in cyber space today. By allowing the collection and analysis of data and 
control of equipment such as pumps and valves from remote locations, SCADA networks 
provide great efficiency and are widely used2.  IEEE Standard 1402-2000, Guide for Electric 
Power Substation Physical and Electronic Security, states:  
“The introduction of computer systems with online access to substation information is 
significant in that substation relay protection, control, and data collection systems may 
be exposed to the same vulnerabilities as all other computer systems. As the use of 
1 E. Byres, G. Gillespie, Plan for Network security, Industrial Networking, Fall 2002 
2 US Department of Energy, “21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks”, retrieved from 
http://www.ea.doe.gov/pdfs/21stepsbooklet.pdf on November 16, 2003 
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computer equipment within the substation environment increases, the need for 
security systems to prevent electronic intrusions may become even more important.” 
 It is fortunate, that vulnerabilities of computer systems are well known and well 
documented.  However, it is important to successfully apply that knowledge to industrial 
networks.  Figure 1. presents electronic intrusion vulnerabilities for industrial networks.  
Over the last 20 years, there were increasingly more complex, sophisticated, and 
capable control systems installed.  These have included more sophisticated basic and 
advanced regulatory control, advanced process control, optimizers, and artificial 
intelligence3.  The field of intelligent instrumentation is going through a major transition.  
The first "smart" transmitters were pioneered by just a few companies some 15 years ago.  
After a rather slow start in the market, one can say that in the past five years, this technology 
has finally received acceptance in the plant instrumentation and maintenance communities.  
The benefits of intelligent devices-enhanced performance, improved 
 
Figure 1. Electronic Intrusion Vulnerabilities 
Source: Paul Oman, Edmund O. Schweitzer, III, and Jeff Roberts, “Safeguarding IEDS, Substations, and 
SCADA systems against electronic intrusions”, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. 2001 
3 William L. (Bill) Mostia (1999).  Out of Control.  Control for the Process Industries, July 1999 
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 reliability, and the ability to provide self-diagnostics have been recognized as contributors to 
improve the processes they control.  Furthermore, prices have come down significantly, 
thereby making the purchase of intelligent devices affordable and justifiable4.  
 It is well-known that IT security has been addressed many times in the past decade.  
Many scary examples of hackers taking over businesses, companies’ web servers and etc., 
indicate the need for continuous improvement of security systems.  Those examples mainly 
show IT vulnerability in business or economic area of peoples’ lives; however, consequences 
of a hacker intruding a power plant security or compromising a web-based automated process 
control system running PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers) and other control devices 
could result in more dramatic outcomes than just shutting down an e-commerce web server or 
interrupting an online business.   
In October, an Australian man was sent to prison for two years after he was found 
guilty of hacking into a waste management system and causing millions of liters of 
raw sewage to spill out into local parks, rivers, and even the grounds of a Hyatt 
Regency hotel.  He exacted this revenge after the area’s council rejected his job 
application to work as a control engineer at the treatment plant.  It appears that the 
problem may be more widespread than most process engineers believe.  The incident 
database maintained by the British Columbia Institute of Technology Internet 
Engineering Lab now contains more than a dozen cyber attacks involving process 
control process systems in all sectors of manufacturing5. 
In order to successfully protect industrial networks, there should be a plan developed 
for security procedures of industrial networks.  In the next chapters of this paper there will be 
4 Peter L. Schellekens, “A Vision for Intelligent Instrumentation in Process Control”. Control Engineering Online, October 2001. 
5 Eric Byres, “Can’t happen at your site?”  www.isa.org, February 2002 
 4 
                                           
some suggestions on how to properly deal with industrial security issues; some possible 
solutions will also be presented. 
 
Identifying Threats and Risks  
Web-based control systems are becoming more used with everyday and the online-
based network control systems create more possibilities for intruders to invade a network 
control system.  Internet technologies such as RSView32 by Rockwell Automation, LabView 
by National Instruments6 are providing great applications for control networks.  However, it 
is necessary to mention that the network and data integrity are not the primary concern of 
those software packages. 
Motivations for electronic attacks against web-based control systems may follow the 
same patterns seen in attacks on Internet E-commerce sites. They can be categorized into five 
broad groups7: 
1. Hackers are computer users who access unauthorized systems simply because they 
can. The relatively benign hacker is motivated by curiosity or the challenge of 
exploration, without overt malicious intent. Others are malicious with the intent of 
gaining notoriety or causing damage. 
2. Espionage is the act of gaining industrial or political advantage by information 
gathering through both legal and illegal means. Much espionage gathers information 
through publicly available resources such as web pages, product descriptions, and 
promotional literature.  Other espionage activities include insider access, theft, and 
illegal surveillance to acquire confidential information. 
6 Software packages that allow engineers control and view control or device networks via WWW. 
7 Paul Oman, Edmund O. Schweitzer, III, and Jeff Roberts, “Safeguarding  IEDS, Substations, and SCADA systems against electronic 
intrusions”, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. 2001 
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3. Sabotage is usually rooted in desires for personal, economic, or political gain 
caused through the destruction of your competitor’s assets, organizational structure, 
and/or market share.  “Hactivism” is an emerging form of sabotage where hackers 
deface or damage corporate Information Technology assets in the name of some 
radical cause. 
4. Electronic Theft is the theft of credit and/or personal identity information, 
frequently stored in corporate IT systems, that can be used in subsequent fraudulent 
schemes. Losses in the U.S. alone are estimated to be billions of dollars. 
5. Vandalism is the destruction of property value without personal gain, as distinct 
from sabotage because it is typically haphazard, random, and relatively localized. 
 
Creation of secure industrial networks is possible only when potential threats and 
risks are identified.  Figure 2. depicts generalization of potential threats. 
 
 
Figure 2. Security Risks and Types of Assault 
Source: Siemens, Information Security in Industrial Communications, October 1999 
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The following presents an example of threats identified for electric power systems8:  
1. The expanded use of public protocols to interconnect protective equipment and 
SCADA systems (e.g. TCP/IP and UCA over Ethernet LANs/WANs). 
2. Increased dial-in and network access to remote sites through public communication 
services (e.g., public phones, Internet). 
3. Instability in the electric power utility job market, creating disgruntled employees 
and ex-employees, caused by deregulation and mergers. 
4. Increased competition for electricity generation and T&D services creating pressure 
to downsize, streamline, automate and cut costs, also causing disgruntled employees 
and ex-employees. 
5. Instability in the electric power service, caused by deregulation and increased 
competition, creating disgruntled customers. 
6. Increased public access to transmission system data mandated by FERC 888/889. 
7. Increased terrorism worldwide and increased foreign government-sponsored 
terrorism and information warfare targeted against North America. 
8. Rapid growth of a computer-literate population and widespread dissemination of 
hacker tools. 
9. Increased electronic theft, recreational hacking, and hacktivism (i.e., the destruction 
of electronic assets for a political or socioeconomic cause). 
 Federal Bureau of Investigation also identified some threats of critical infrastructure 
that are presented in Table 1. 
8 Paul Oman, Edmund O. Schweitzer, III, and Jeff Roberts, “Safeguarding  IEDS, Substations, and SCADA systems against electronic 
intrusions”, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. 2001 
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Table 1.  Threats to Critical Infrastructure Observed by the FBI 
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 
Resulting consequences of a possible intrusion of industrial or SCADA network could 
be as follows9:  
• Shut down the substation or any portion of the subsystem controlled by the 
compromised device, either immediately or in a delayed manner. 
• Change protection device settings to degrade reliability of the device and, 
subsequently, the electric service provided by the substation. 
• Gather control and protection settings information that could be used in a 
subsequent attack. 
9 Paul Oman, Edmund O. Schweitzer, III, and Jeff Roberts, “Safeguarding  IEDS, Substations, and SCADA systems against electronic 
intrusions”, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. 2001 
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• Change or perturb the data in such a manner as to degrade electric service or 
cause loss of service. 
• Plant malicious code that could later trigger a delayed or coordinated attack. 
• Shut down the regional service controlled by that SCADA system, either 
immediately or in a delayed manner. 
• Steal or alter metering data gathered by the SCADA system. 
• Use the SCADA system as a backdoor into the corporate IT system to obtain 
customer credit and personal identity information commonly used in electronic 
theft. 
 
Development of security procedures for industrial control networks 
 In order to successfully protect industrial control networks, E. Byres and G. Gillespie 
suggest protecting control network integrity by starting not from technology, but from 
creation of an industrial cyber security policy.  The authors of the article “Plan for Network 
Security10” present the following characteristics of a typical industrial cyber security policy: 
• Establish a secure production communication infrastructure and a stable 
processing environment. 
• Effectively manage the risk of security exposure and intrusion. 
• Communicate the responsibilities of users, management, and information system 
staff for the protection of information and provide direction toward honoring this 
commitment. 
• Provide a requirements outline for those staff charged with technical 
implementation. 
• Promote understanding and compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. 
10 E. Byres, G. Gillespie, Plan for Network security, Industrial Networking, Fall 2002 
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• Limit company liability and preserve management’s options in the event of a 
security incident. 
The responsibility for an industrial cyber security policy should reside at the highest 
organizational structure.  Below that should be a production-based technical team charged 
with standards implementation, technical management, and enforcement. The consistent 
application of the security policy will reduce the risk and liability of all persons involved11. 
US Department of Energy suggest following these 21 steps to improve industrial 
control network security12: 
1. Identify all connections to SCADA networks 
2. Disconnect unnecessary connections to the SCADA network 
3. Evaluate and strengthen the security of any remaining connections to the SCADA 
network 
4. Harden SCADA networks by removing or disabling unnecessary services. 
5. Do not rely on proprietary protocols to protect your system. 
6. Implement the security features provided by device and system vendors 
7. Establish strong controls over any medium that is used as a backdoor into the SCADA 
network. 
8. Implement internal and external intrusion detection systems and establish 24-hour-a-
day incident monitoring. 
9. Perform technical audits of SCADA devices and networks, and any other connected 
networks, to identify security concerns. 
10. Conduct physical security surveys and assess all remote sites connected to the 
SCADA network to evaluate their security 
11 E. Byres, G. Gillespie, Plan for Network security, Industrial Networking, Fall 2002 
12 US Department of Energy, “21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks”, retrieved from 
http://www.ea.doe.gov/pdfs/21stepsbooklet.pdf on November 16, 2003 
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11. Establish SCADA “Red Teams” to identify and evaluate possible attack scenarios. 
12. Clearly define cyber security roles, responsibilities, and authorities for managers, 
system administrators, and users 
13. Document network architecture and identify systems that serve critical functions or 
contain sensitive information that require additional levels of protection. 
14. Establish a rigorous, ongoing risk management process. 
15. Establish a network protection strategy based on the principle of defense-in-depth. 
16. Clearly identify cyber security requirements 
17. Establish effective configuration management processes 
18. Conduct routine self-assessments 
19. Establish system backups and disaster recovery plans. 
20. Senior organizational leadership should establish expectations for cyber security 
performance and hold individuals accountable for their performance 
21. Establish policies and conduct training to minimize the likelihood that organizational 
personnel will inadvertently disclose sensitive information regarding SCADA system 
design, operations, or security controls. 
 
In comparison to business IT security, it might seem that there are no clear security 
guidelines developed for SCADA and web-based control networks.  However, general 
suggestions given here could be extremely useful for each particular industry. 
 
Recommendations and Conclusions 
 Jonathan Pollet argues, that SCADA security is often overlooked13: 
13 Jonathan Pollet, SCADA Security Strategy, PlantData Technologies August 8, 2002 
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Now, more than ever, utilities and oil and gas producers are taking precautions 
to ensure the security of their information systems, implementing protections for 
known potential points of access via the Internet.  The problem lies in the fact that 
many SCADA systems involve various components that bridge the world between IT 
and Facility Engineering.  There is typically not a lot of teamwork and collaboration 
between the IT security efforts and the Data Acquisition teams that are focused on 
delivering field and facility data reliably to company stockholders and end users.  
Everyone assumes that it is an IT issue, but IT staffs are rarely have the expertise and 
background in SCADA and industrial automation systems to adequately develop 
security tests or measures for these systems. 
A survey by Riptech found that about 70 percent of the operating manuals for 
those systems are available to the public.  These systems for the process industries are 
particularly vulnerable because they were not designed for use with Internet 
applications. 
The White House report on critical infrastructure protection recommends the three 
following steps to secure network-based infrastructure14: 
“We suggest consideration of these immediate actions prior to the completion of a 
formal risk assessment:  
(1) Isolate critical control systems from insecure networks by disconnection or 
adequate firewalls,  
(2) Adopt best practices for password control and protection, or install modern 
authentication mechanisms,  
(3) Provide for individual accountability through protected action logs or the 
equivalent.” 
14 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, White House Communications on Critical Infrastructure Protection, October 22, 1997: 
http://www.julieryan.com/Infrastructure/IPdoc.html. 
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Robert F. Dacey, Director of Information Security Issues of United States General 
Accounting Office, states the following:  
A significant challenge in effectively securing control systems is the lack of 
specialized security technologies for these [control networks] systems.  As I [Robert 
F. Dacey] previously mentioned, the computing resources in control systems that are 
needed to perform security functions tend to be quite limited, making it very difficult 
to use security technologies within control system networks without severely 
hindering performance. 
Although technologies such as robust firewalls and strong authentication can 
be employed to better segment control systems from enterprise networks, research and 
development could help address the application of security technologies to the control 
systems themselves.  Information security organizations have noted that a gap exists 
between current security technologies and the need for additional research and 
development to secure control systems 
Several steps can be considered when addressing potential threats to control 
systems, including15:  
• Researching and developing new security technologies to protect control 
systems.  
• Developing security policies, guidance, and standards for control system 
security.  For example, the use of consensus standards could be considered to 
encourage industry to invest in stronger security for control systems.  
• Increasing security awareness and sharing information about implementing 
more secure architectures and existing security technologies.  For example, a 
15 Robert F. Dacey, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, 
Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census, House Committee on Government Reform, United States General Accounting Office, October 
1, 2003 
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more secure architecture might be attained by segmenting control networks 
with robust firewalls and strong authentication.  Also, organizations may 
benefit from educating management about the cybersecurity risks related to 
control systems and sharing successful practices related to working across 
organizational boundaries.  
• Implementing effective security management programs that include 
consideration of control system security.  We have previously reported on the 
security management practices of leading organizations.  Such programs 
typically consider risk assessment, development of appropriate policies and 
procedures, employee awareness, and regular security monitoring. 
 
For standardizing purposes, there are several organizations that perform security 
testing and evaluation of SCADA and control networks.  Table 2. presents those 
organizations. 
Sandia National Laboratories has developed several software packages and 
methodologies, computer aids and etc. in order to find improvement for security of SCADA 
networks.  IDART (Information Design Assurance Red Team) methodology by Sandia 
National Laboratories is presented by Figure 3. 
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Table 2.  Organizations to improve control network security 
Source: Robert F. Dacey, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on 
Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census, House Committee on 
Government Reform, United States General Accounting Office, October 1, 2003 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  IDART methodology by Sandia National Laboratories 
Source: http://www.naseo.org/committees/energysecurity/energyassurance/hutchinson.pdf 
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Siemens Company argues16 that the following are the five steps that could secure a 
network: 
1.  Defining the "Security Policy“ 
A fundamental component of every solution is a corporate "security policy“, which 
defines the significance and organization of IT security for the enterprise.  The 
objectives of any security policy are to create binding specifications and to describe 
the basic organization.  The wholesale support of corporate Management is essential if 
this kind of policy is to be effectively implemented throughout the company. 
2.  Security Concept and Security Management 
Specific measures are described within the security concept.  The concept takes into 
account the individual business processes and communication links inside and outside 
the company.  In addition, external influences such as legal regulations and 
requirements imposed by company's business associates are other factors to which 
consideration has to be given. 
The security management necessary for the measures defined in the security concept 
requires clearly defined responsibilities - in other words, the special security tasks to 
be performed by each and every staff member have to be clearly defined. 
3.  Implementing the Security Measures 
The measures selected are put into practice during the implementation phase on the 
basis of the previously defined security policy and the security concept. 
Implementations of this kind are rarely ready-made, but represent a customized 
solution in each individual case which takes account of the special requirements of the 
company.  This ensures that the security solution can be harmoniously integrated into 
the existing infrastructure and the associated system architecture. Nevertheless, it may 
16 Siemens, Information Security in Industrial Communications, October 1999 
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be necessary, despite this, to adjust individual business and/or communication 
processes and to redesign them to comply with the security policy.  In a few cases, 
even restrictions or additional effort and cost may be the result. 
4.  Security Consciousness and Training of Staff Members 
The success of all the actions taken towards information security to date is highly 
dependent upon the attitude of the different staff members.  Without the active support 
of all the persons concerned within the company, it will barely be possible to achieve 
the specified security objectives. Both decision-makers and all other staff members 
should therefore be induced to be security-conscious.  Suitable means for achieving 
this are regular security information meetings and specific training sessions. 
5.  Control and Monitoring 
So that a specified security level can be guaranteed permanently, the measures 
introduced and compliance with the security guidelines have to be monitored and 
controlled at regular intervals.  This is the only way of eliminating existing gaps in 
security and detecting potential risks. 
In conclusion, it is important to point out the uniqueness of the security of web-based 
industrial networks and SCADA networks.  It is obvious, that there are potential threats and 
risks associated with industrial control networks.  The battle for IT security must go on, 
especially when dealing with security of industrial control networks. 
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